McDermott Can’t Ditch CB&I Merger Suit, Texas Judge Says
Craig Clough, 14 April 2021
A Texas federal judge explained Wednesday that McDermott International Inc. must face a securities fraud suit over its acquisition of Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., denying its motion to dismiss and finding that stockholders sufficiently pled that proxy statements from McDermott were made “with actual knowledge that they were misleading.”
U.S. District Judge George C. Hanks Jr. already denied McDermott’s motion to dismiss on March 31 in a one-page order, and issued his full opinion behind the order on Wednesday that said McDermott cannot escape the allegations it concealed material problems with the integration of CB&I’s business and the likelihood that its projects would incur higher-than-expected costs. Continue reading “Article: McDermott Can’t Ditch CB&I Merger Suit, Texas Judge Says”
The PSLRA’s Discovery Stay During the Pendency of a Motion To Dismiss Applies in State Court Actions Asserting 1933 Act Claims
Craig S. Waldman , 08 November 2019
One of the PSLRA’s key procedural protections is the automatic stay of discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. This serves “to protect defendants … from the burden and expense of premature discovery … until the court sustains the sufficiency of the complaint.” ATSI Communications v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 2003 WL 1877227, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 2, 2003). “The legislative history of the PSLRA indicates that Congress enacted the discovery stay to prevent plaintiffs from filing securities class actions with the intent of using the discovery process to force a coercive settlement.” In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Congress also aimed “to prevent plaintiffs from … using [a meritless lawsuit] as a vehicle ‘in order to conduct discovery in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim not alleged in the complaint.’” In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 129, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995)). Continue reading “Article: The PSLRA’s Discovery Stay During the Pendency of a Motion To Dismiss Applies in State Court Actions Asserting 1933 Act Claims”
Grounding the Short Circuit: The Need for Supreme Court Intervention in Scienter Pleading Requirements for Private Securities Fraud Cases After the Second Circuit’s Decision in ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007)
Joe Ehrich, 08 March 2013
The Second Circuit, in ATSI, disregarded the pleading and review instructions the Supreme Court established in Tellabs by stating that plaintiffs may plead a strong inference of scienter using only allegations of motive and opportunity or conscious misbehavior or recklessness. This decision has allowed plaintiffs to plead scienter using only such individual allegations; encouraged courts within the Second Circuit to conduct abbreviated reviews of complaints at the dismissal stage; undermined the Court’s intent for a heightened, uniform scienter pleading standard capable of reducing frivolous litigation and allowing the advancement of meritorious claims; and contributed to the renewal of a wide circuit split over whether motive and opportunity allegations are sufficient to plead scienter.
In sharp contrast to the divergent policies and practices of the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit adopted the full Tellabs provisions. It therefore utilizes the scienter pleading standard that the Supreme Court intended. Given the serious consequences of this split, the Second Circuit standard merits further discussion. This Note begins by discussing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which established the pleading requirements for private securities fraud claims. Part II details the post-PSLRA circuit split over motive and opportunity allegations, and the pleading provisions the Supreme Court established in Tellabs. Part III describes the pleading prescriptions created by the Second Circuit in ATSI.
Part IV discusses how the ATSI standard diverges from Tellabs by allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter through individual allegations, which has led to only partial application of the Tellabs dismissal review process in the Second Circuit and has undermined the Supreme Court’s intent for a heightened, uniform scienter pleading standard capable of reducing frivolous claims. This Part also details how ATSI contributed to the post-Tellabs circuit split over motive and opportunity allegations, and argues that the Supreme Court must rectify this untenable situation by fortifying the Tellabs review test. If the Court does not, plaintiffs who sue in the Second Circuit, as the Doe shareholders may, will continue to receive more favorable treatment at the pleading stage and have a greater opportunity to receive undeserved settlements from innocent defendants such as the Doe CFO than those who sue in the Third Circuit.
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In Pursuit of the Naked Short
Alexis Stokes, Texas State University
Journal of Law and Business 5/1 (Spring 2009)
This article explores the origins of naked short-selling litigation; considers
the failures of significant naked short-selling lawsuits in federal court;
surveys the obstacles erected collectively by constitutional standing requirements, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, brokerage firms, death spiral financiers, and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation; examines the efficacy of Regulation SHO, SEC rule 10b-21, and new FINRA rules; discusses recent state legislation and state court litigation; and identifies non-litigation options to curb naked short-selling. Ultimately, this article seeks to answer the question: If manipulative naked short-selling is more than a mythological scapegoat for
small cap failure, what remedies are, or should be, available?
PDF (62 Pages): Article In Pursuit of the Naked Short